Veto is a prerogative to unilaterally overrule a decision. A private veto protocol consists of a number of participants who wish to decide whether or not to veto a particular motion without revealing the individual opinions. Essentially all participants jointly perform a multi-party computation (MPC) on a boolean-OR function where an input of "1" represents veto and "0" represents not veto. In 2006, Hao and Zieliński presented a two round veto protocol named Anonymous Veto network (AV-net), which is exceptionally efficient in terms of the number of rounds, computation and bandwidth usage. However, AV-net has two generic issues: 1) a participant who has submitted a veto can find out whether she is the only one who vetoed; 2) the last participant who submits her input can pre-compute the boolean-OR result before submission, and may amend her input based on that knowledge. These two issues generally apply to any multi-round veto protocol where participants commit their input in the last round. In this paper, we propose a novel solution to address both issues within two rounds, which are the best possible round efficiency for a veto protocol. Our new private veto protocol, called PriVeto, has similar system complexities to AV-net, but it binds participants to their inputs in the very first round, eliminating the possibility of runtime changes to any of the inputs. At the end of the protocol, participants are strictly limited to learning nothing more than the output of the boolean-OR function and their own inputs.
Introduction
In 1988, David Chaum first proposed a dining cryptographers (DC) problem [9] . Three cryptographers sit at a table to have dinner together. At the time of payment, they are informed by the waiter that someone, who may either be NSA or one of the cryptographers, has already paid for the dinner. The cryptographers respect each other's right in making a private payment but they want to find out if NSA paid. Essentially they want to securely compute a boolean-OR function with the input "1" representing 'I paid' and "0" representing 'I did not pay'. If the output of the boolean-OR function is "0", it means that NSA must have paid (since no cryptographer has paid); otherwise, NSA has not paid. To securely find the result, the three cryptographers executed a two-stage protocol called Dining Cryptographers network (DC-net), proposed by Chaum [9] . In the first stage, the three cryptographers establish a pairwise shared secret bit between each other, e.g., by tossing a coin secretly behind a menu. In the second stage, each cryptographer announces a bit which is the XOR of his shared secret bits with the other cryptographers if he did not pay, or the opposite value if he paid. After the two stages, everyone, including any third party observers, can calculate the XOR of all announced bits: if the result is "0", it means NSA has paid for the dinner; and otherwise, NSA has not paid. While the original protocol is described for three participants, it can be easily generalized to accommodate any number of participants more than three.
The aim of the DC-net protocol is to allow multiple parties to securely compute a boolean-OR function, but it has a "collision" problem whereby when an even number of participants use "1" in their inputs, the protocol will falsely return "0". This problem is acknowledged in Chaum's paper [9] as one major limitation of DCnet. Chaum proposed to resolve this problem by "retransmission", but details of the retransmission mechanism are not specified in [9] . Follow-up works by other researchers propose to address this problem by setting up "traps" to probabilistically detect the collision and disruption [5, 15, 25] , but they tend to make the DC-net system much more complex. There are also other limitations of DC-net, such as the requirement of pairwise shared keys between participants, which leads to a O(n 2 ) system complexity for n participants.
To address the limitations of DC-net, Hao and Zieliński [19] proposed an alternative solution called Anonymous Veto network (AV-net). In some sense, AV-net can be seen as a translation of DCnet from a non-cryptographic setting to a cryptographic one. The construction of AV-net echoes a similar idea in DC-net by combining shared secrets in a particular way to achieve a cancellation effect. The major difference between the two is that DC-net only involves sending boolean values, while AV-net is built on publickey cryptography, and it utilizes established cryptographic primitives (e.g., zero-knowledge proofs) to enforce every participant to honestly follow the protocol specification. AV-net only requires 2 rounds of broadcast, which is the best possible round efficiency for a veto protocol. It is also exceptionally efficient in terms of the computation and the bandwidth usage. The system complexity is O(n), as opposed to O(n 2 ) in DC-net. Among the veto protocols proposed in the literature [7, 17, 21] , AV-net is the most efficient in every of the following aspects: the number of rounds, computation, bandwidth and system complexity.
However, the AV-net protocol has two generic issues. First, a participant who has submitted "1" as the input can find the boolean-OR of other participants' inputs. In other words, if a participant vetoes, she can find out if she is the only one who has vetoed or not. Second, the last participant who submitted her input can pre-compute the result of the boolean-OR function, and hence may amend her input accordingly. The latter problem can be alleviated by introducing an intermediate round in which all participants first commit to their inputs, thus eliminating the scope of any runtime change to the value of the input in the subsequent round. However, this remedy increases the round complexity of the protocol to 3 rounds.
In this paper we address these issues by proposing a new private veto protocol called "PriVeto". Same as AV-net, the proposed protocol has only two rounds. It binds participants to their inputs in the very first round in a way that no participant will be able to find the boolean-OR of all the inputs until the second round ends. The ciphertext generated by a participant in the second round depends upon the ciphertexts generated by other participants in the first round. By then all the ciphertexts coming from the first round of the protocol have already been committed (e.g., published on a public bulletin board), which eliminates the possibility of amendment by any participant. Our protocol strictly limits each participant to learn nothing more than the output of the boolean-OR function and their own private inputs. The privacy of each individual input is guaranteed even under the extreme case that all other participants collude against a single victim (i.e., a full-collusion attack). By contract, in AV-net, in the extreme scenario of full-collusion, the privacy of the individual input can no longer be guaranteed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses approaches that have been proposed for securely computing the boolean-OR function. Section 3 describes our proposed approach for anonymous veto. Section 4 presents the security proofs of the proposed protocol. Section 5 presents the system complexity of the protocol. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
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Related Work
Multiparty computation
The DC-net problem can be seen as a secure multi-party computation (MPC) problem for computing a boolean-OR function while preserving the privacy of each individual input. A general MPC problem is to compute a function f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , xn), on secret inputs x i provided by n participants respectively. At the end of the protocol, each participant would learn the output of the function f over all the secret inputs, but they do not learn anything more than the output and their own inputs. The first general protocol for the secure two-party computation was proposed by Yao [26] . The Fairplay [22] system presents an implementation of Yaos protocol. This system generates the circuits by representing the computed functions of each participating party as high level languages (Secure Function Definition Language (SFDL) and Secure Hardware Definition Language (SHDL)). A number of methods have been proposed [3, 4, 10, 14] to generalize Yao's twoparty computation method to multi-party computation (MPC). The MPC protocols of Goldreich et al. [14] and Assaf et al. [3] are based on boolean circuits that represent the function. In theory, the general MPC solutions can work with an arbitrary polynomial-time computable function assuming that the majority of the players are honest [10] . However, general MPC techniques are rather inefficient for computing specific functions such as boolean-OR [20] . Furthermore, they typically require pairwise secrete authenticated channels between players in addition to a public authenticated channel. The establishment of pairwise secure channels is complex to realize in practice [19] . For these reasons, researchers normally propose specific MPC solutions to efficiently solve specific problems, e.g., e-voting [18] , secure network statistics aggregation [1, 2, 8, 16] , secure function computation [12] and secure auctions [23] etc.
Review of AV-net
There have already been a number of protocols proposed to perform secure multi-party computation on a boolean-OR function [7, 9, 17, 19, 21] . Among these solutions, AV-net, due to Hao and Zieliński in 2006 [19] , is known to be the most efficient in terms of the number of rounds, computation and bandwidth.
AV-net does not require any pairwise secret and authenticated channels. It only assumes an authenticated public channel, which is typically implemented by a public bulletin board [17] where participants publish data with a digital signature to prove authenticity. Let G denote a finite cyclic group of prime order p in which the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is intractable. Let g be a generator in G. Assume there are n participants. The protocol proceeds in two rounds. (All computations are modular, and we omit the modulus for simplicity.)
Round 1: Every participant P i chooses a random secret x i ∈ R Zp and publishes A i = g xi and a zero-knowledge proof (Schnorr signature [24] ) for proving the knowledge of x i . When this round finishes, each participant P i computes
We can also represent the above as
Round 2: Every participant P i publishes C i = B ci i , where c i is either x i for the input "1" or a random value r i ∈ R Zp for the input "0", together with a zero-knowledge proof (Schnorr signature [24] ) to prove the knowledge of c i .
After Round 2, every participant computes ∏ i C i . If no one vetoes, we have ∏ i C i = 1; otherwise we have
Note that when no one vetoes, all the random factors x i vanish because
Although AV-net is exceptionally efficient, it has two generic issues. The first issue, as highlighted in the original AV-net paper [19] , is that a participant P i who has sent the veto message ("1") in the second round will be able to find out if she is the only one who vetoed at the end of the second round. To learn this, she just needs to substitute her input in Round 2 with "0" and re-calculate the boolean-OR function. Note that she can do this non-interactively without the cooperation from other participants. Thus she can learn the boolean-OR of all other inputs, which is equivalent to knowing if she is the only one who has submitted a veto. As only the vetoer can learn this extra-bit information, we call this the vetoer's advantage. The second issue is that the participant who sends data at last in Round 2 can pre-compute the boolean-OR, thus knowing the outcome before others, and she might alter her input based on that knowledge. We call this the last player's advantage. It seems inevitable that the participant who sends data at last will learn the result before others, but the run-time change of the input should be prevented.
These two issues are generally applicable to other veto protocols [7, 17, 21] where participants send the input in the last round. The last player's advantage can be alleviated by requiring all participants to commit their input first, so they cannot change it later, however that will require an additional round of sending commitments.
3
The PriVeto Scheme
In this section, we present a novel solution to address both issues in AV-net without increasing the number of rounds. Our new protocol is called PriVeto. For any integer n ≥ 1, we define [n] to be the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Setup
Let there be n participants identified as
, denote the unique identities of the participants. Each partici-
The n participants want to securely compute the value of T = ∨ n i=1 v i . Our protocol uses a finite multiplicative group G of p elements, p being a prime number. The Decisional Diffie Hellman problem is assumed to be intractable in G. Let g andg be two random generators of G, whose discrete logarithm relationship is unknown. Let, Hash 1 , Hash 2 : {0, 1} * → Zp be two secure one-way hash functions. Hence, the setup function takes as input the security parameter λ and generates the following system parameters.
We assume there is an authenticated public channel, which can be realized by a public bulletin board as in [7, 17, 19, 21] . The bulletin board is readable to all, and writable only to authenticated participants with a digital signature to prove the data authenticity.
Protocol
The PriVeto protocol works in two rounds as below:
where π i is a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof [24] to prove the knowledge of z i = log g Z i , and π * i is a NIZK proof [11] to prove the knowledge of
and
posts these 2 NIZK proofs on the bulletin board. V i also posts an intermediate ballot b i computed as follows:
Here, g i =g ri where r i = Hash 1 (id i ||Z i ||ϕ i ). Hence, both r i and g i can be computed by anyone after fetching all the three inputs (i.e. id i , Z i , ϕ i ) from the bulletin board. The participant V i also computes NIZK proofπ i of the fact that b i is either g ai or g ai g i . This is an OR proof of two statements with the first statement being log g b i = log Zi ϕ i and the second statement being log g b i /g i = log Zi ϕ i (see Appendix for a detailed construction of this NIZK proof). We expressπ i as follows.
from the bulletin board. Then she computes
Each participant V i : i ∈ [n] computes a final ballot B i as follows:
Essentially, this is an equality proof that logB Once, every participant has posted the ballot in the second round
∑ n j=i+1â iâj = 0. Readers are referred to [19] for a proof of the above fact. Now,
Note, that g k is independent of A and g
Hence,T is a random element in G (and is not 1 with overwhelming probability). Thus we get:
This way everyone can find T , the boolean-OR of all n input bits by computingT = ∏ n i=1 B i .
Analysis
Completeness of the Scheme
We show that our 2-round PriVeto protocol is correct, that is it correctly computes the boolean-OR of all input bits. It is worth noticing that when
∑ n j=i+1â j = 1. Now, we need to show that if there exists at least one k ∈ [n], such that v k = 1, then T will be random. For this purpose, let us assume
j=1â j . Our algorithm will output ∨ n i=1 v i = 1 if and only ifT ̸ = 1. So, for the scheme to be correct, we need to show thatT ̸ = 1 with overwhelming probability. We know that,
.
That is,
Hence, we get:
Thus, the scheme is correct. 
Security assumptions
Lemma 3. Assumption 3 implies assumption 4.
Proof: According to assumption 3,
Security analysis of the PriVeto scheme
The security model:
Now, we show that our scheme is secure against a PPT adversary who can compromise all but one participant. If the scheme can protect the privacy of the sole uncompromised participant under full collusion scenario, then the scheme could be called secure. We show that if the Decisional Diffie Hellman assumption holds in the group G, the scheme will be secure. In order for proving our security claim, we choose the following security model. In this model, there are two entities: the challenger and the adversary who together enact the full collusion scenario. The setup function generates the public parameters (G, p, g,g, n). The challenger creates one participant with a random id k ∈ [n]. The adversary creates n − 1 participants with ids in the set [n] \ {k}. The adversary controls these n − 1 colluding participants. The challenger chooses random Z k , ϕ k ∈ G, and generates( or simulates) the NIZK proofs
. The challenger sends G, p, g,g, n, Z k , ϕ k , π k , π * k to the adversary. The challenger replies to all queries to the hash oraclesH and H made by the adversary. The adversary outputs a i , z i , π i , π * i . Since, π i and π * i are proofs of knowledge of z i , and a i , the adversary has to invoke the prover algorithm with these two witnesses (a i , z i ) in order to generate π i and π * i . The challenger can get to learn these values when the prover algorithm is called by the adversary, and can match them with the values of Z i and ϕ i sent to the challenger by the adversary. If any of the NIZK proofs returned by the adversary is not properly generated, the challenger aborts, and the adversary fails. The adversary also returns a set of inputs {v i : i ∈ [n] \ {k}} which represent the inputs of the n − 1 colluding participants. It can be observed that if all the n − 1 inputs of the colluding participants are 0, the output of our protocol (boolean OR of all inputs) will be equal to the input of the honest participant controlled by the challenger. Thus, in this model we add a condition to make it mandatory for at least one colluding participant to have a 1-bit as input. Note that, the adversary may choose the inputs of other colluding participants as she wishes. Thus, there is no upper bound to the value of κ = |{i : Figure 2 describe the security experiment 
Security experiments:
π and π * are two NIZK proofs that prove that the prover knows the values of log g Z and log Z ϕ respectively. The NIZK proofs do not provide any useful information other than what they are intended to prove. The DDH adversary D has to find e. Since the NIZK proof systems used in the experiment are secure, we may define the advantage of the adversary D as below:
From the discussion in section 4.2, we can say that if the DDH assumption holds in G, then
We now present a series of games below. Game 2: This game same is the experiment EXp Figure 3 . The advantage of the adversary B ′ is defined as below:
The difference between Game 1 and Game 2 is that in Game 2, we substitute the two hash functions viz. 
Game 3: This game same as the experiment EXp Figure 4 . The advantage of the adversary A is defined as below:
The difference between game 3 and game 2 is that in game 3, the query-format to the second oracle H is of the form id i , a i , z i , π i , π * i as opposed to its format game 2 in which the query-input is of the
Note that when the adversary of game 2 makes a query of the form id i , g zi , g aizi , π i , π * i , she has to know the values of a i and z i , as otherwise computing π i and π * i would amount to breaking the security of the non-interactive zero knowledge proof system used to compute π i or π * i which are proofs of knowledge [11, 24] . Hence, the difference between the distinguishing advantages of an adversary in game 2 and game 3 is negligible, that is,
From the above discussion, we can infer that
That is:
Security proof:
Now, we shall show that our PriVeto protocol is secure against full collusion. For this purpose, we first state and prove the following theorem.
Proof: We show that if there exists an adversary A against the P OBC experiment, then it could be used to construct the
a . π and π * are the two NIZK proofs that prove that the values of a and z are known to the prover. D now simulates EXP P OBC A (λ) with the help of A. D answers A's queries to the oraclesH and H. Let Q be the maximum number of queries A makes to the oracleH, H. Obviously, Q ∈ poly(λ).
Step 1:
. . ,vn randomly such thatv i = 1 holds at least for one value
It should be noted that vα = 1. During this process, A may also make queries to both the oraclesH and H. These queries are answered by D as follows:
• If the query is to the oracleH and the query input can be parsed as id i ,Ẑ i ,φ i , for some i ∈ [n] \ {k}, then sample a random m i ∈ Zp and return it. Register (id i ,Ẑ i ,φ i , m i ) in the logL i .
• If the query is to the oracleH and input can be parsed as id k , Z k , ϕ k , and return m.
• Else if the query is to the oracleH return a random element from Zp.
All queries to the oracle H can be answered by D as follows:
• If the query is to the oracle H, and the input can be parsed
aizi ) has already been queried by A) and if there exists a j ∈ [n] \ {k} such that no query of the form H(id j , a j , z j , π j , π * j , b j ) has ever been made, then return a randomã i ∈ Zp.
• Else, if the query is to the oracle H, and the input can be parsed as
aizi ) has already been queried by A) and for all j ∈ [n] \ {k}, the log L j contains at least one entry of the form
Here,
Sample a random R ∈ R Zp. Returnã i , where:
• Else return a random element from Zp.
Step 2: Now, A outputs the index α and
Step 3: Else D computes the intermediate ballot
has been queried, then if
Step 4: 
Fig. 2: Description of the security experiment Exp
has not yet been queried, then let
Step 5:
and if l > k, compute
Also let,
Step 6: : If D has not already aborted, the following relation holds:
That is
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Thus, we can write:
Let, A denote the event that D does not abort in step 2 and B denote the event that D does not abort in step 3. Hence, 
. We try to find the probability that A queries
(aj +ãj )) holds. The event B|A happens when there exists j ∈ [n] \ {k} such that in step 1, D replies to the query
li , where l i is the number of entries of the form 
Fig. 4: Description of the security experiment Exp
. Since, the maximum number of oracle queries made by the adversary is Q,
That is
Adv
P OBC
Since, Q ∈ poly(λ), and n is constant, (λ) ≤ negl(λ) holds. Therefore, our two round PriVeto protocol will be secure against full collusion, if the DDH assumption holds in G.
Efficiency Analysis
In this section, we analyze the computation and communication efficiency of our scheme. Since, exponentiation is the costliest operation, we measure the computation cost in terms of the number of exponentiations done by an entity. In Round 1, each participant needs to do just 3 exponentiation operations to compute the Z i , ϕ i and the intermediate ballot. The NIZK proofs π i and π * i need one exponentiation each. The NIZK proofπ i requires 6 exponentiations, making the total exponentiations needed by a single participant in Round 1 equal to 11. In Round 2, the computation of the final ballot would require 2 exponentiations and the associated NIZK proof Π i would require 2 exponentiations. Thus, in Round 2, each participant needs to do 4 exponentiations. Hence, the total number of exponentiations that a participant is required to perform during the entire protocol is 15. On the other hand, a verifier who wants to check all the NIZK proofs would need to perform 17n exponentiations. Table  1 shows a break-down of the computation overhead on a participant and a verifier. Now, we calculate the communication overhead of the protocol. Each participant V i needs to post Z i , ϕ i and b i in Round 1. The participant also needs to post the two NIZK proofs π i and π * i of size 6 in total. Thus, in Round 1, each participant needs to transfer 9 items. In Round 2, each participant needs to post only the final ballot B i and the NIZK proof Π i . The participant also needs to download all arguments uploaded by all other participants in Round 1. Together, they add up to 9n + 5. The size of all NIZK proofs of all the n participants is 18. Table 2 The number of group elements in the usage of communication bandwidth. Here, n is the total number of participants.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel two round veto protocol that addresses the two major limitations of the original AV-net protocol. Our scheme achieves the best possible round efficiency for a veto protocol. In addition to that, it has the same asymptotic system complexities as the AV-net protocol. We have proved that our scheme is secure against full collusion in a random oracle model, assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable in the algebraic group used in the scheme.
